As long as the members of the Swiss Federal Council are re-elected, they can stay in government as long as they want and resign when they deem best. They can not be impeached. A term lasts four years. Mostly they stay between eight and ten years, try twelve. It happens rarely that they are not re-elected by parliament. Each councilor heads one of the seven departments, and each is vice-councilor in one of the others. They decide who's the council's presidents, who then guides the meetings and is the highest representative of the Swiss Federal Council and with it of Switzerland. The chancellery is in charge of the “West Wing”. It's the eighth member of the Federal Council, always present at all meetings but without voting power : the keeper of the secrets.
Sustainable Power : Because under a collegial or directorial regime there is a regular exchange of federal councilors, the population forgets their names and doesn't associate government action anymore in the first place with the leader (Bush administration, Obama administration), but with the institution (the Federal Council). That differentiation between the highest public office and its members depersonalizes the first and makes it possible for subsequent councilors to build on the trust and experience the previous ones had created and entrenched in the council's administration.
Trust that is needed in times where governments' actions are in full contradiction to the individual interests of most citizens (cheap nuclear energy for example), but necessary to be inline with the current holistic needs of society (protection of waste and accident).
Experience that leaders would need to close tax loopholes not only in their neighbours' gardens but also in their own. Experience and trust their strong but monopolar executive forms can only rarely build and lock-in - if it's not by being tempted through autocratic ways of staying in power and such "guarantee stability", leading to division of society and amongst increasing dolefulness to violent extremism rather.
Natural Balance : The clear differentiation between the Federal Council as head-of-state and the councilors as members of the Federal Council allows for wise long term governance, i pretend. At the moment ( 2o11-12 ) for instance it gives the seven politicians - the center of power of the governing elite - an excuse to set party-colors aside in order to find in the national interest compromises that in other democracies are sometimes only possible after dissolvement of parliament or the executive and new elections, or through the creation of unity-governments or parliamentary super-committees, if.
Continuity ( or slowness / stability ... ) : The lack of differentiation between the eternal head-of-state and its ever-changing members causes a loss of continuity in western democracies. The fact that top-officials are replaced with each lost elections to reflect party-colors only adds to the negative effects of western yo-yo politics, that is a bloating administration and higher taxes. In a directorial central authority, not only are power transitions smooth because rarely more than two members resign at the same time, but also because the councilors can time their departure with the end of the implementation of important projects.
Political Innovation : Some US Senators are desperately trying to take back central powers to a state level. Their motivation is the reduction of central bureaucracy in return for administrative innovation : a government for the 21st century. Their initiatives to promote federalism seem to find a positive feedback amongst the population. A directorial executive would give also a constitutional support. The councilors are actually inclined to wait with certain political fights at the oval table and watch how the different approaches evolve independently in the states first. A council is the federalist's best friend.
Intelligent Corruption : A lack of transparency in Swiss political donations is regularly mentioned. The Swiss people are anyway rather happy with the overall performance and proximity of maybe not the individual councilors but the Federal Council as a whole. The additional decision making process in the divided government seems hence ( i could pretend ) to rather effectively dilute unconstitutional attempts to control the use of public assets and forces.
I could also pretend the Swiss don't mind corruption, since they are passively profiting from the corrupt practices of their multinationals, paying through their taxes at home a minimum income, health care and education for the poor so they don't obstruct these practices. A pretention i could pretend can't be true because it's the right-wing that is corrupt while it is the left-wing promoting basic income and equality. It's not so sure though, because as i said, there is a lack of transparency in Swiss political donations.
Concluding Deduction : If the United States would be governed by a council, low public pressure would be exercised on the new councilors : it's the established and experienced members of the presidential seven who would feel the heat of the street. And with members irregularly changing, there would always be an established one who becomes rightfully the target of the competitors, who'd be "kindly" ask to think about stepping down. The poker game for a share of the federal doughnut would always be on. Considering the fate of the American superpower would be at stake and not Switzerland, it'd be eternal paradise for the news channels.
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january 2o12
